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Game Theory and Nash Equilibrium
A game has players, outcomes, and strategies. The question that games raise
in the world of both math and economics is how best to define the players, the
moves, and the strategies. Games are a fundamental part of economics. The
science of economics is often said to be the study of how people allocate scarce
resources to suit various needs. Economics can also be thought of as the study
of many games being played at once, and how the strategies of players affect
the outcome. A useful concept in the realm of economics is "utility." Utility is a
quantitative measure of how much use an economic agent gets out of the results
of any particular decision. Games can arise when multiple players have conflicting
wants, and when both seek to maximize their utility. Nash equilibrium is a state
where no players in a game can expect to get a higher utility by changing their
strategies so long as the strategies of the other players do not change. Below are
several areas in which game theory is applied to the science of economics.
Duopoly Theory
A duopoly occurs when only two firms sell a product and control its price. This
case is opposed to the case of perfect competition, in which innummerable firms
offer an identical product whose price is determined by the average total cost of
the most cost-efficient producer. A duopoly presents an interesting case of game
theory, as the actions of each firm affect the welfare of the other firm.
Fig. 1: Bertrand Price Competition
Duopolies can compete in quantity or price. Cournot quantity competition occurs
when the firms change the quantity they sell based on the quantity sold by the
other firm. Each firm has a reaction function whose independent variable is the
quantity sold by the other firm and whose dependent variable is their own quantity
sold. Where these functions intersect determines the equilibrium quantity each
firm will produce.
Bertrand price competition occurs when one firm gains all market demand by
undercutting the price of the other firm. The other firm will respond by
undercutting the first firm. This will eventually lead to both firms selling at a price
equal to their marginal costs.
Ordering of Preferences, Voting, and
Organizations
Given three preferences labeled A,B,C and three or more voters who rank
these preferences in different orders, it is impossible to determine the best
overall preference for all three voters when preferences are voted on two-by-two.
If person a has preference ranking A > B > C and b has preference ranking
B > C > A and c has preference ranking C > A > B, then in a vote between A
or B, A wins. In a vote between A or C, C wins. In a vote between B or C, B
wins. This violates the principal of transitivity: A is preferred to B is preferred to C is
preferred to A. This means that it is impossible to rank preferences on a society-wide level
when voting two-by-two.
A cartel consists of members who agree to output a certain amount of a good at a certain
price, in order to receive as much profit as a monopoly would. Each member of the cartel
has an incentive to "cheat". Any member supplying the product at a lower price than the
other members would reap all the profits. The incentives to break the agreement are so
high that penalties must be put in place to ensure members do not "cheat."
Producers are much more easily organized into a coalition than consumers are. The ratio
of producers to consumers of a good is such that the costs of organization are higher for
consumers than for producers. It’s extremely rare to see a "union" of consumers whose
objective would be to demand a lower price of a good, because the size of this union would
be so large that each individual member will make the choice to behave as if he wasn’t in
the union, trusting the other members to take up the cause of lowering the price of a good.
This is one example of what is known as the "free-rider problem."
Pareto Optimality
Pareto Optimality is a condition in which among a set of moves from a given position, there
is no move that will increase the welfare of one player without decreasing the welfare of
another player. A set of possible outcomes is called a Pareto Region. In his paper The
Relevance of Pareto Optimality, James M. Buchanan shows that the set of possible Pareto
optimal outcomes is dependent on the "rules" applied to the Pareto Region in question.
Unanimity in rule changes will result in a limited Pareto region, where the optimal outcomes
have meaning. Changes in the rules defining a Pareto region can be optimal or not.
Fig. 3: Two Firms and Pareto Optimality
One instance occurs when two firms A and B share a pool of fixed amounts of
labor L and capital K between them. The amount of a resource used by one
firm is equal to the total minus the amount used by the other firm. Assume that
each firm wants to produce as much output as possible. Each firm has several
isoquants, all combinations of labor and capital to produce a given level of output.
Each firm seeks to position themselves opposite their origin. Given any
pre-determined allocation of labor and capital to A and B, the set of all possible
Pareto Optimal outcomes lies on the line whose points are the tangential
intersections of all pairs of opposing isoquants. At any point on this line, A
cannot move to a higher isoquant without B moving to a lower isoquant, and
vice versa. However, at a point not on this line, a firm can move to the line and
produce the same output while increasing the output of the other firm. The
diagram above is known as an Edgeworth Box.
Henry S. Farber’s Theory of Final Offer
Arbitration
In his paper An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, Henry S. Farber created a
mathematical model that outlined the strategies of two parties in submitting a
final offer to an arbitrator during a contract dispute. Final-offer arbitration (FOA)
occurs when each of the two parties submits a final offer to the arbitrator, and
the arbitrator chooses which offer will be enforced. The arbitrator must choose
one or the other offer and enforce it. The arbitrator knows what is “fair” and will
choose the offer that is closest to what he considers to be “fair.” Each party’s
strategy will involve guessing what the arbitrator’s sense of “fair” is (labeled yf )
and making a final offer that is closer than the other party’s final offer to yf
while maximizing their utility. Suppose the dispute concerns the distribution of
some good between party A and party B. y is the amount A receives and 1-y
is the amount B receives. yA is the offer of party A and yB is the offer of party
B. If we assume yA > yB, then the probability that B’s offer is enforced is
yPr(chB) = F ( A+yB)2 , where F denotes the cumulative distribution function of
the random variable yf . If the average of both offers is larger than yf , then B’s
offer will be enforced, and if the average of both offers is smaller than yf , then
A’s offer will be enforced. The expected utility of each party is
E(UA) = [1− F (
yA + yB
2
)]UA(yA) + F (
yA + yB
2
)UA(yB)
and
E(UB) = [1− F (
yA + yB
2
)]UB(1− yA) + F (
yA + yB
2
)UB(1− yB)
."Given that the parties are manipulating their respective final offers so as to
maximize their respective expected utilities, the Nash equilibrium set of final
offers is that pair of final offers which has the property that neither party can
achieve a higher expected utility by changing its final offer."
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